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JULY, NINETEEN HUNDRED AND TWENTY-ONE
"My keenest interest is excited, not by what are called great questions
and great cases, but by little decisions which the common run of selectors
would pass by because they did not deal with the Constitution, or a
telephone company, yet which have in them the germ of some wider
theory, and therefore of some profound interstitial change in the very
tissue of the law."-Mr. Justice Holmes, Collected Legal Essays, p. 269.

NOTES ON RECENT
MISSOURI CASES
CONFLICT OF LAWS-TITLE TO CHATTELS UNDER CONDITIONAL SALE MADE OUTSIDE OF STATE. Jerome P. ParkerHarris Co. v. Stevens.' Plaintiff sold an automobile conditionally to one
Martin in Tennessee, the contract of sale providing that title should
remain in plaintiff until the agreed purchase price was paid, but Martin
was given possession of the car. It was further stipulated in the agreement that Martin should not take the car out of Tennessee, without
plaintiff's consent in writing, until the purchase price was paid, and it
was agreed that if Martin did so remove it that plaintiff could proceed
under the contract as if Martin was in default. After the sale, Martin,
without plaintiff's consent, removed the car to Missouri, and there dis1.

(1920)

224 S. W. 1036.
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posed of it to one Stephens, who was a bona fide purchaser for value.
The conditional sale was valid where made, and plaintiff's title under
Tennessee law would have been good as against Stephens' although the
conditional bill of sale was neither recorded or filed in Tennessee, such
a proceeding not being required there by law. Both of the parties to
the conditional sale were domiciled in Tennessee.
Plaintiff, having discovered that the car was in Missouri, brought
this action against defendant, who claimed under Martin, to replevy the
car, claiming that his title under the Tennessee conditional sale was
good, and prevailed in Missouri as against that of defendant. On the
other hand, defendant contended that plaintiff's title was not good in
Missouri because Missouri had a settled policy against the sustention
of secret liens and titles against innocent purchasers for value, where the
property with respect to which the lien is claimed has been surrendered
and the possessor clothed with apparent ownership. This argument apparently was based on the fact that the Missouri statutes' required the
recording of all chattel mortgages and conditional sales of chattels given
within the state. It was easy to argue from this that the statutes showed
a policy against all unrecorded transactions of this kind and to contend
that plaintiff did not have any rights to the automobile within Missouri,
which would be superior to defendant's. The Springfield Court of Appeals, however, decided for plaintiff, holding that as a matter of comity
plaintiff's title should be sustained. The court said that where the sale
is valid where made, and the vendor does not assent to the chattel's
being removed to another jurisdiction the vendor's title should be protected everywhere, unless there was a policy against the vendor's rights
at some subsequent situs of the chattel. The court concluded that there
was no such policy in Missouri, because there was no express statute
dealing with such matters, and because the recording statutes of Missouri only purported to deal with local conditional sales. It was therefore
stated that the law of the place where the sale was made would govern
plaintiff's rights and title.
According to early continental writers on conflict of laws, questions relating to title to personal property were referred to, and determined by the law of the domicle of the owner.' There are dicta to this
effect in some of the English cases' and the doctrine has had the support of some of the earlier cases in this country.' In the case of Cam2. Grange Warehouse Association v.
Owen (1888) 86 Tenn. 355, 7 S. W. 457.

Doe. d. Birswhistle v. Vardill 5 Barn
& C. 438.

3. Sect. 2889 R. S. Mo. 1909.
2284 R. S. Mo. 1919.

Sect.

6. Edgerly v. Bush (1880) 81 N. Y.
203. For a Canadian decision applying

4 Pothier, Des Choses 2 No. 3; Witxendorf, De Stat. 15 No. 11.

the rule, see Bank v. Corcoran, 6 Ontar-

5. Sill v. Worsdick 1 H. B1. 1. c. 690;

io527.
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mell v. Sewell,' however, the Court of Exchequer Chamber held that
title to goods, the property of a British owner, sold in Norway, was to
be governed by the laws of the latter country. It thus applied the law
of the situs of the goods, which in this case happened to be identical
with the law of the place of the contract of sale. The rule that the law
of the situs shall control questions of title has now become generally
0
recognized in England,' in this country,' and on the Continent."
It has
The change in the law seems
the support of most modern jurists.'
to be due to the rise of new economic conditions." During the mediaeval
period the importance of chattels in the life of a country was practically
negligible, but since the industrial revolution, the role which they play
in national life has become of great importance, and their control by
the state in which they are located is imperative; hence, the change
in the rule of law, and the assertion of the principle that matters of
title to chattels must be regulated by the law of their situs.
A sale is a transaction whereby title to chattels is transferred from
one person to another for a money consideration." By it the vendee
steps into the shoes of the vendor, and is enabled to assume the same
position towards the chattel which the vendor, whom he succeeds has
occupied." This passage of title, and the resultant rights as they concern not only the parties themselves, but also the state in which the
goods are located are subject to the regulation of that state. There is
a further theoretical consideration, which would force us of necessity
to the same conclusion, namely, rights can arise only out of the application of law to certain states of facts, and the law to be applied must be
that in force where the facts exist." There must be a coincidence of
law, which gives the right, and facts to which the law attaches. Now
the essential facts out of which the rights of vendor and vendee arise
7. (1859) 5 Hurl & N. 728, 2 Law
Times 799. An earlier English decision
which seems to follow this rule is Inglis v. Usherwood (1801) 1 East 515.
8. Alcock v. Smith (1892) 1 Ch. 228;
Castrique v. Inrie, (1909) 29 L. J. C.
P. 350, 5 E. R. C. 899; Embricos v.
Anglo Austrian Bank (1904) 2 K. B.
870; Halsbury's Laws of England 213.
9. Oliver v. Townes (1824) 2 Mart.
(n. s.), (La.) 93; Green v. Van Buskirk (1868) 7 Wall 139, 19 L. Ed. 109,
Lorenzen's Cases on Conflict of Laws
292; Schmidt v. Perkins (1907) 67 Atd.
77, 11 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1007 (N. J.).
A Canadian case is Stave Co. v. Still, 12
Ontario 557. It seems to reverse the

Corcoran case supra, note 6.,
10. See authorities cited in Lorenzen's Cases on Conflict of Laws, p. 292,
note.
11. Wharton Conflict of Laws, 3 ed.
Vol. I, p. 674; Von Bar, Theorie und
praxis des internationalen privatrechts.
(Gillispie's Translation) 2 ed. 231.
12. Wharton Conflict of Laws, 3 ed.
Vol. I, p. 615.
13. 35 Cyc 25;
Williston's Sales,
Sect. 2.
14. Holmes, The Common Law, Chap.
X.
15. Huberus, Prae. Juris Romani et
hodierni, Vol. II, lib. I, tit. 3., cited 3
Dall. 1. c. 370 note.
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as to property in the goods exist only at the situs of the goods, therefore,
only the law there in force is the law which can create these rights. Accordingly the law of the situs of the chattels must govern as to property
15
rights growing out of a sale. a
It has been attempted to show that the matter of title to chattels, in
its inception, according to modern authority, is one that is controlled
by the law of the situs of the chattel at the time of the transaction, which
it is claimed results in the passage of title. The difficult question, however, is to what extent will a title, valid by the law of that situs, be
recognized and sustained if the chattel is removed by another jurisdiction?
Suppose that A gets a good title in state 1 where the chattel then was;
suppose that the chattel is removed to state 2; will A's title be valid
there too, and will A be able to claim the chattel there? So far as principles of conflict of laws are concerned, A's title, outside of state 1, would
not of necessity be good. The law of state 1 is not present in state 2
except as a fact, if proved, and has no force or effect there to give A
any rights with respect to any chattels. This being the case, A's rights
in state 2 will depend on the extent to which that state desires to give
effect to the laws of another state and to recognize a foreign created
title. As a general rule, one state is disposed to recognize a foreign title
within its boundaries, and to sustain and sanction it. This is a matter
of common courtesy due from one state to another; a matter of comity.
But it is conceivable that state 2 might not be willing to sustain A's
title. It might be that giving recognition to A's foreign title would be
contrary to the policies of state 2, and if this were the case, A should
have no rights to the chattel there, because comity would not compel
state 2 to extend recognition to A's title.'" Surely no state should or
would recognize a foreign title if its policy deemed such a right against
its best interests. It would seem then, that the question in all this class
of cases is, does the foreign right, which is asserted, militate against the
best interests of the state? Is there a policy against the sustention of
such a title? If there is such a policy, the title ought not to be sanctioned, but if there is not, it should be.
Assuming that the title of a conditional vendor is good by the law
of the situs of the chattel at the time that the sale occurs, that title
might be questioned at a new and later situs of the chattel, by a bona
The situation in the case of a

situs of a chattel governs in the case

conditional sale is essentially the same.
The questions are, when does the vendee
get full and complete title? What interests does the vendor retain, pending
the performance of the condition? As

of a sale, it must govern also in the
case of a conditional sale.
16. Marshall v. Sherman (1895) 148
N. Y. 24, 42 N. E. 419; Flag v. Bald.
win (1884) 38 N. J. Eq. 219, 48 Am.

against whom

Rep. 308.

15a.

is the vendor's interest,

if he has any, good?

If the law of the
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fide purchaser under one of the following general states of facts, (1)
where there is a statute at the new situs, declaring the title of such foreign vendor to be void, or (2) where there is a statute at the new situs,
which does not on its face purport to deal with the rights of a foreign
vendor, but merely provides that the rights of a vendor under a similar
bill of conditional sale, executed within the state, shall be void as against
a purchaser for value unless the bill of condition sale is recorded. It
has been said that under the first state of facts assumed the vendor's title would not prevail because the statute precludes its recognition"
Where there is a statute at the new situs, regulating locally executed
conditional sales, making them void as against a bona fide purchaser
unless the bill of sale is recorded, it would be possible to hold that the
statute has no bearing on the rights of a vendor under a foreign sale.
It could be said that, as the statute purports to regulate local sales, sales
made elsewhere than within the state were not affected by it. There is
8
authority to this effect," and where this is the rule, the rights of the
foreign vendor would be good as against everyone, just as they would
be at the original situs of the goods, where the rights were acquired.
On the other hand, it might be said that the statute, even though it did
not attempt to regulate titles under foreign sales, nevertheless showed a
17. Hervey v. Locomotive Works
(1876) 93 U. S. 664, 23 L. Ed. 1103,
Lorenzen's Cases Conflict of Laws 307.
But quaere even in such case is it proper for the state to thus divest the
title to a chattel present within its boundary without the consent of its owner.
If it has jurisdiction of the chattel then
clearly it may do what it will with the
title. It was said by the Supreme Court
of the United States in Rose v. Hunsly
4 Cranch 241, cited II Mores Dig. Inter.
Law c. 7. that: "Whatever may be the
municipal law under which a tribunal
acts if it exercise a jurisdiction which
its sovereign is not allowed by the law
of nations to confer its decrees must be
disregarded out of the dominions of that
sovereign." Thus the courts of a sovereign may not exercise jurisdiction over
the persons of foreign ambassadors, etc.
IV Moore Dig. p. 622. Nor should the
courts of a state get jurisdiction of the
person of one present in that state because of fraud or violence, etc. May it
not well be that international law imposes a like restriction on the obtaining

of jurisdiction over chattels where they
are present in the state without the consent of the owner? It is submitted that
this is the proper explanation of the decision in Edgerley v. Bush, supra, note
6.
Suppose that a plaintiff forcefully
seizes a foreign defendant and brings
him into the state and there serves him
No court ought to
with a summons.
uphold jurisdiction thus gained even if
the law of the forum issuing the summons permitted such procedure. Is not
the analogy good in the case of chattels wrongfully brought into the territory
See 24 Harv. Law
of a sovereign?
Rev. 567.
104
18. Sharpatd v. Hynes (1900)
Fed.
499, Lorenzen's Cases Conflict of
Laws, 203;
Drew v. Smith (1871) 59
Me. 393, 22 Atl. 250; Wooley v. Geneva
Wagon Co. (1896) 59 N. J. L. 278, 35
Bros. Co. v.
Atl. 787;
Studebaker
Mann (1905) 18 Wyo. q58, 80 Pac. 151;
Dupont Powder Co. v. Jones Bros. (1912)
Swain v. Schild (1917)
200 Fed. 638;
117 N. E. 933. (Ind. App.)
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policy against secret titles of conditional vendors, no matter where the
title was acquired, and under such a holding, the title of a foreign vendor would not be treated as valid, but would be dealt with in the same
way as the title of a domestic vendor under an unrecorded bill of conditional sale.
It is undoubtedly true that the statute, above referred to, does show
a policy at the new situs against secret titles, and such policy might
well be applied to all titles, domestic and foreign, if the application of the
policy would not work too great an injustice to the vendor. If the foreign vendor, therefore, has assented to the removal of the chattel, covered by the sale, to the new situs, it would be proper to hold that the
rights of an innocent purchaser of the chattel should be superior to those
of the vendor. The vendor by assenting to the removal of the chattel,
and its presence at the new situs, has in fact submitted the chattel to the
jurisdiction of the laws of that situs. This being the case, the only
logical holding would be that the vendor's title under the assumed facts
was void. It would be altogether improper to allow a vendor, just because he has a foreign title, to escape the effect of policies in force at
the new situs, he having himself assented to the placing of the chattel
at this situs.
Suppose, however, that the vendor has not consented to the removal
of the chattel to the new situs; ought the decision under these facts
to be that his title is gone just because of the policy against secret liens?
It would seem that, in spite of the policy at the new situs, the vendor's
title ought to be protected, and held valid even as against a bona fide
purchaser, because it would be clearly unjust to deprive a man of his
property, when it has been removed against his will from a state where
he had placed it. He has not in any way submitted the chattel to the
jurisdiction of the new situs, nor is he responsible for its presence at the
new situs. It is one thing to say if an owner send a chattel into a state
that it shall be subject to the jurisdiction and policies of that state, but
quite another that the chattel shall be so subject when it has come within
the state illegally and against the owner's will. It would be unjust and
against public policy to hold to this result under the last assumption. So
when the chattel is at the new situs with the vendor's assent, the courts
would for the most part, hold that the vendor's title was void,"' but where
it was at the new situs without the vendor's consent that it was good,'
and such decisions are sound.
19.
97 N.

In Boyer v. Knowlton Co. (1911)
E.

13:1 there

is a clear decision

that the lex situs and not the lex contractus governs. See also Southern Hardware Co. v. Clark (1913) 119 C. C. A.

339, 201 Fed. 1.
contractus,

Contra, applying lex

Emerson

Co.

v.

Procter

(1903) 48 Att. 849 (Me.).
20. See Edgerly v. Bush, supra, note
6, and cases cited under note 18. Con-
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It has been held that where the retention of title is void by the law
of the situs where the goods were at the time of the sale, but valid by
the law of a state to which they were later removed the latter law
would apply.2' Such a rule on principle seems to be wrong. The law
which raised the rights under the sale was the law of the situs of the
goods at that time; it was the only law which had jurisdiction over the
matter of title. Limits might be placed on the recognition of a title
good by the law of the original situs of the goods by the law of another
and later situs, but the law of a later situs could not increase the rights
originally gotten by the vendor. The law of such later situs had no application to the transaction by which the vendor's title, if he got any,
was created.
The case under review is the only Missouri decision in which
the question of the law governing foreign conditional sales has been
raised. There have been, however, some cases involving the general
question of foreign titles to chattels, which throw some light on the
problem here under consideration. In the first case of the kind decided
in the Missouri courts, Smith v. Hutchinson," the Supreme Court held
that title under a sale where possession was retained by the vendor
was to be governed by the law of the state where the sale was made,
and the property located at the time of the sale, rather than by the law
of the state into which the goods were subsequently taken and the action
brought. The court did not have to choose between the law of the
domicile, the place of contract, or the situs. The later cases have all
been mortgage cases. In Feurt v. Powell' and Bank v. Metcalf' the
courts held the validity of a mortgage depended on the law of the place
where the goods were located and the contract made rather than on the
law of the forum, but in neither case was there an actual decision
against the lex domicili or lex contractus, and in favor of the lex situs.
In Bank v. Morris' the court expressly applied the law of the situs.
Tower Brothers Co. v. Iamilton' construed the validity of a mortgage
lien and the recording of the mortgage by applying the law of this state,
tra: Cunningham v. Surtain (1895) 96
Ga. 849, 23 S. E. 420, which cites and
follows the early line of cases applying
the lex domicilli in questions of title to
chattels; Willy$ Overland Co. v. Chap.
man (1919) (Tex.) 206 S. W. 978; Judy
v. Evans (1903) 109 Ill. ApP. 134;
Chambers v. Consolidated Garage Co.
(1919) (Tex.) 210 S. W. 978. These
last cases seem to go on the ground that
the statutes evidence a policy which ap-

plies as well to foreign as to domestic
vendors.
21. Weinstein v. Fryer (1890) 93 At.
257, 9 So. 856. Contra: Davis v. Os.
good (1899) 54 N. H. 227, 44 Att. 432,
22. (1861) 30 Mo. 380.
23. (1876) 62 Mo. 524.
24. (1888) 29 Mo. App. 384.
25. (1893) 114 Mo. 255, 21 S. W.
511.
26. (1904) 77 S. W. 1081. Compare
Fessenden v. Taft (1889) 65 N. H. 39.
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it being the situs of the goods, although the contract was made in
Kansas. The validity of the mortgage debt as regards the rate of interest charged was properly tested by the lex contractus, this matter having nothing to do with the question of the title of the mortgagee. The
rule mentioned above, that if the goods sold conditionally are brought
into the state of the forum with the consent of the vendor, the vendor
loses any rights which he had by the law of the goods' former situs,
but which are denied by the policy of the law of the forum gains support from the analogous case (dealing with the rights of a chattel mortgagee) of Geiser Mfg. Co. v. ToddY It was held in that case that the
mortgagee lost his lien, when the goods were brought into this state
with his assent as against a person in the position of an innocent purchaser for value.
In the instant case, the court was not forced by the facts before
them to decide whether the domicilary law of the parties, the law of
the place of the contract, or the law of the situs at the time of the conditional sale, governed the rights of plaintiff. All of these places were
identical, hence the law of all was the same. There is dicta in the case
to the effect that the law of the place of the contract should govern
plaintiff's rights. In the light of the foregoing discussion, it is believed
that this suggestion is unsound, and that the law of the situs of the
chattels at the time of the sale is the proper law to apply in
determining this question. But the actual decision in the case is correct for the reason that the situs of the chattel at that time and the
place of the contract were one and the same.
B. E.

TORTS-VICIOUS DOGS-LEGAL CAUSE-LABILITY AT
PERIL. Clinkenbead v. Reinert.! Parents brought an action for the
death of their minor child caused by rabies received from wounds inflicted by defendant's rabid dog. The Supreme Court of Missouri held
defendant liable, even though defendant did not know and was not
chargeable with knowledge of the rabid condition of the dog. The owner
knew or should have known that the dog was vicious and disposed to
bite mankind. The court states that the gist of the first count of the
action was the keeping of the dog after knowledge of its vicious propensities, and the owner being under a duty to kill the dog was liable
for an injury inflicted by the dog without proof of negligence. Woodson, J., dissented in part.
The petition also contained a second count basing a cause of action
upon a city ordinance prohibiting the keeping of vicious dogs. The
27.

(1918)

204 S. W. 287.

1.

(1920)

235 S. W. 667.
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court were unanimous upon the plaintiff's right to recover under this
count. The particular set of facts appears to present a case of first impression although the principle involved is by no means new. The
result obtained may be desirable but the reasoning employed, it is submitted, may be questioned. At common law the rule defining the liability of the keepers of dogs known to be vicious is stated to be: "But
if one knowingly keeps a vicious or dangerous animal, which is accustomed to attack and injure mankind, he is prima facie liable for injuries
done by it, without proof of negligence as to the manner of keeping it.
The negligence on which the liability is founded is keeping such an animal with knowledge of its propensities. Thus it is evident that as respects the liability of the owner, there is no distinction between the case
of an animal which breaks through the tameness of its nature, and is
fierce, and is known by its owners to be so, and one which is ferae naturae. But while the ancient rule, as generally found stated, is that the
gist of an action for injuries inflicted by a ferocious animal is keeping
it, with knowledge of its vicious propensities, negligence or the want
of negligence being deemed immaterial, to some courts a more accurate
statement of the true principle governing the owner's legal responsibility
seems to be that the gist of the action is the failure to keep such animals securely."la
In the principal case the court has this to say on this point: "In
the instant case the owners were long before the incident which brought
about the horrible and untimely death of this little girl, fully advised
of the vicious propensities of the dog. When so advised it became their
absolute duty, for the protection of the public, either to kill or safely
restrain their dog. A failure to do one or the other rendered them
liable. The trend of our Court of Appeals is to require the killing of the
vicious dog rather than his restraint. Much authority elsewhere is to the
same effect, and we are disposed to and do adopt the more rigid rule
of our Court of Appeals."2 This view is well supported by the cases in
this country and in England.' However, the authorities are by no means
harmonious. Judge Cooley has this to say in his work on Torts :4 "In
May v. Burdett,' an action for an injury by the bite of a monkey was sustained, though no negligence was charged in the declaration. In Connecticut, this case has been cited as authority to the point that the keeping
of a vicious dog, after notice of his evil disposition, is wrongful and at
Ia. 1 R. C. L. p. 1089. To like effeet. 3 C. J. 97; 2 Am. & Eng. Ency.
of Law (2nd Ed.) 366.
2. The court cites Speckmann v.
Kreig (1899) 79 Mo. App. 376; O'Neill
v. Blase (1902) 94 Mo. App. 648, 68 S.
W. 764; Merritt v. Mitchell (1909) 135

Mo.
3.
97.
4.
5.
Eng.

App. 176, 115 S. W. 1066.
The cases are collected in 3 C. J.
Cooley on Torts, 2d. Ed. p. 411.
(1846) 9 Q. B. (N. S.) 101, 3
Ruling Cas. 108.
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the peril of the owner, 'and, therefore prima facie the owner is liable to
any person injured by such a dog, without any averment or proof of
negligence in securing, or taking care of it'.' But admitting the prima
facie case, may not the keeper show that the animal was kept by him
with due care and for some commendable purpose,' and that he escaped
under circumstances free from fault in him? The keeping of wild animals for many purposes has come to be recognized as proper and useful; they are exhibited through the country with the public license and
approval; governments and municipal corporations expend large sums
in obtaining and providing for them; and the idea of legal wrong in
keeping and exhibiting them is never indulged. It seems, therefore, safe
to say that the liability of the owner or keeper for any injury done by
them to the person or property of others must rest on the doctrine of
negligence. A very high degree of care is demanded of those who have
them in charge, but if, notwithstanding such care they are enabled to
commit mischief, the case should be referred to the category of accidental injuries, for which a civil action will not lie."'
In Scribner v. Kelly' the court places liability of the keepers of animals squarely on the ground of negligence. Scrugham, J., speaking
for the court, had this to say: "The liability of the owner or keeper
of an animal of any description, for an injury committed by such animal, is founded upon negligence, actual or presumed. It is not in itself
unlawful for a person to keep wild beasts, though they may be such as
are of a nature fierce, dangerous and irreclaimable; but as the propensity of such animals to do dangerous mischief is well known, and is
inherent and not to be eradicated by any effort at domestication, nor restrained except by perfect confinement or extraordinary skill and watchfulness, the owner or keeper of such dangerous creatures is required to
exercise such a degree of care in regard to them as will absolutely pre6. Woolf v. Chalkcr (1862) 31 Conn.
121.
7. Sarch v. Blackburn (1830) 4 C. &
P. 297 (nisti prius) "....
undoubtedly
a man has a right to keep a fierce dog
for the protection of his property; but
he has no right to put the dog in such
a situation, in the way of access to his
house, that a person innocently coming
for a lawful purpose may be injured by
it."-Tindal, C. J.
8. Cooley on Torts, 2d. Ed. note 3,
page 412. "As to the law respecting the
keeping of wild beasts, we should say
that the higher cultivation of the intel.
lect of the mass of the people as com-

pared with two or three centuries ago,
and the recognition of wants in human
nature then ignored, must have worked
some changes, and that we must take
up the common law of that period in this
as in many other particulars more to
locate accurately our point of departure
than to fix definitely a stake to which
we must tie and adhere.
When wild
animals are kept for some purpose recognized as not censurable all we can de.
mand of the keeper is that he shall take
that superior precaution to prevent their
doing mischief which their propensities
in that direction justly demand of him."
9.
(1862) 38 Barb.
(N. Y.) 14.
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vent the occurence of an injury to others through such vicious acts of
the animal as he is naturally inclined to commit. Under such circumstances the occurence of the act producing the injury affords sufficient evidence that the owner or keeper has not exercised the degree of care required of him, and his failure to do so is negligence."
In that case the plaintiff sued to recover damages for an injury caused
by the fright of the plaintiff's horse at the sight of the defendant's elephant which was travelling on a public thoroughfare. The court very
properly applied the test of foreseeability. "In this case the injury resulted not from the act of the elephant, but from the fact that his appearance, as he was passing along the highway, caused the horse of the
plaintiff to become frightened and unruly. To render the defendants
liable for the damage that accrued, it would be necessary to show, not
only that such is the effect of the appearance of an elephant upon horses
in general, but also that the defendants knew or had notice of it; for if it
is conceded that the elephant is of a savage and ferocious nature it does
not necessarily follow that his appearance inspires horses with terror.""
It is submitted that the rule laid down in the Scribner case is desirable in that it furnishes a criterion long established in the law and capable of a fairly consistent and logical application. It is believed that
were a like principal case presented where the dog is known to be vicious
but not known to be diseased, most courts that have adopted the "liability
at peril" doctrine, or the extreme rule stated in the case under review,
i. e. that the keeping of an animal known to be vicious is wrongful and
the keeper's duty is to kill it would, as indicated in McCaskill v. Elliott
cited in note 8, supra, impose responsibility only for "all the harm that
he might reasonably have expected to ensue",1 and so not impose liability
for rabies. (Italics supplied.)
This is in fact no more than saying that
the keeping of an animal after knowledge of its vicious propensities is
negligence and that such a negligent wrongdoer will be liable for all
the foreseeable consequences of his negligent conduct. Suppose A keeps
a vicious watch-dog; B, an aged person who lives next door to A, is
knocked down and injured or killed by the dog while the dog is pursuing

10.

(1850)

Accord.

McCaskill

v.

Elliot

couple of 'liability at peril' with 'foresee-

5 Strobharts Law (S. Carolina)

ability', which, it is submitted, in fact

196, 53 Am. Dec. 706, holding that
"..... every such animal (dog known

is nothing more than saying that the
keeping of a dog after knowledge of its

to be vicious) the owner keeps at his
risk, being, without regard to care or
negligence, an insurer against all the

vicious propensities, is negligence, and
that liability is then measured as in any
other case of negligence i. e. foresee-

harm that he might reasonably have expected to ensue."
(Italics supplied.)
This case illustrates an attempted

ability.
11. McCaskill v.
supra.

Elliott, note

10,
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a thief who has been upon A's premises. Is it to be believed that an
action will lie for the injury or death?
The so-called doctrine of absolute liability or doing at peril has appeared
in other branches of the law. From the cases it would appear that it has
very generally been either frankly repudiated or has become so decimated
by limitation that it scarcely merits consideration as a principle of law.
Notable among these cases is Fletcher v. Rylands" where it was laid down
that one who collects water upon his land is under an absolute duty, at
all events to restrain the water from escaping so as to damage. In the
very next case to come before an appellate English Court" the rule was
relaxed so as to exclude acts of vis major or the acts of other persons
over whom the defendant had no control. 4 This broad principle has been
very generally repudiated in the United States."
And so in the case of fire, it is said that at early common law one
set out a fire at his peril." But under the modern law the decisions are
practically unanimous in declaring the duty is to exercise care in the
light of all the circumstances."
It is curious to note that Blackburn, J., in his opinion in Fletcher v.
Rylands," rests the rule he there lays down as to confining water at peril
upon the decisions defining the duty of keepers of vicious animals. The
rule of liability at peril has broken down in the cases of fire and water.
It is an arbitrary, unwieldly and illogical rule and it is believed the
reason why it has not been more generally repudiated in the -case of animals is that the element of useful property value in animals has not sufficiently appealed to the courts to incline them to a departure from the
original rigid rule of liability at peril, as has been done in cases of fire
and water as incident to the use of land. The results in the animal cases
have been in most instances sufficiently desirable to permit the courts to
gloss over the reasoning employed to support their decisions.
(1866) L. R. 1 Ex. 265, L. R. 3
12.
House of Lords 330, 1 Eng. Ruling Cas.

235.
13. (1876) Court of Appeals. Nichols
v. Marsland, 2 Ex. D. 1 (s.c. 46 L. J.
Ex. 174.)
14. By a constant paring down by
limitation little appears to remain of the
broad principle laid down in Fletcher v.
Rylands. In the case of Eastern and
South African Telegraph Co. v. Cape
Town Tramways Co., Privy Council, 1902,
L. R., 1902, Appeal Cases 381, the court
employs the curious devise of turning
from the acts of the defendant to the use
the plaintiff was making of his land in
order to obtain an obviously desirable

and reasonable result without absolutely
repudiating the decision in Fletcher v.
Rylands.
For a review of the English cases under Fletcher v. Rylands see note in 1
Eng. Ruling Cas. page 266.
15. Mr. Freeman,
the
editor of
American Decisions, says in a note, 29
Am. Dec. 149, that "the doctrine is not
adopted in this country". And Mr. Justice Holmes condemns it in 14 American
Law Review p. 1.
16. Salmond on Torts, 3rd. Ed. 224.
17. Salmond on Torts, 3rd Ed. 226;
Cooley on Torts, 2d Ed. 700.
18. See note 12, supra.
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It is submitted that tort liability must flow out of two kinds of acts,
(1) wilful acts, wrongful in themselves; (2) negligent acts. The doing
of wilful acts renders the actor liable for all the natural consequences
flowing from them without regard to anticipatibility. The test to be
applied is one of physical causation. But the doing of negligent acts
renders the actor liable only for the natural and probable consequences
of his acts. The test applied in Missouri to determine liability for negligent conduct appears to be that of foreseeability.5
The facts in the instant case do not show acts wilful and wrongful
in themselves. There is no wrong for which either a criminal or civil
action will lie in keeping a vicious dog. It is true that the dicta in some
of the cases go so far as to declare a vicious dog to be a public nuisance
which may be abated by killing the dog, but it is believed that none of the
decisions goes this far. In the cases examined the dog was running
loose (this is certainly negligence) and had therefore become a nuisance
through the negligence of the owner.
If the public welfare requires the absolute destruction of vicious
dogs or animals fierce by nature (these classes of animals are universally
treated together) it is the function of the legislative branch to meet this
need. In the instant case a city ordinance had accomplished the result
desired. Blair, J., and Woodson, J., concurred in the result only upon
the count based upon the city ordinance. It is submitted that the opinion
of Woodson, J., contains a more desirable statement of the law, and it is
hoped, his position will be adopted when the point is again pfesented for
decision. He says in part, page 670: " . .... no liability is shown upon
the first count. My reasons for so stating are: The evidence conclusively
shows that the deceased child would not have died from the effects of
the dog bite had it not been afflicted with rabies, and the evidence also

conclusively shows that the defendant had no notice or knowledge whatever that the dog had rabies before, or at the time, it bit the child. That
being true, he was guilty of no negligence which caused or contributed
to the injury which caused the death of the child, and therefore he is
not liable in damages for the death that ensued therefrom."
D. W.
19. Saxton v. Missouri Pacific Ry. Co.
(1903) 98 Mo. App. 494, 501, 72 S. W.
717:
"Consequences must be probable
as well as natural" - - "one which might
reasonably have been foreseen by a man
of ordinary intelligence and prudence."

Paden v. Van Blarcom (1903) 100 Mo.
App. 185, 192, 74 S. W. 124; Aldrich v.
St. Louis Transit Co. (1903) 101 Mo.
App. 77, 74 S. W. 141; Feddeck v. St.
Louis Car Co.
(1907) 125 Mo. App.
24, 102 S. W. 675.
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CRIMINAL LAW-HUSBAND AND WIFE--PRESUMPTION
OF COERCION. State v. Bragg.' In State v. Kiethley' the court was
apparently of the opinion that in the prosecution of a woman for keeping a bawdy house there is no presumption that she was coerced by her
husband even though he is present at the commission of the crime. On
the other hand it was indicated that the defendant would have been entitled to an instruction that the jury in determining her guilt should take
into consideration her relationship with her husband provided there had
been a request for such an instruction. The decision under review is in
accord.
The general rule is that whatever of a criminal nature the wife does
in the presence of her husband is presumed in the absence of evidence
to the contrary to have been done through his coercion.! There are certain exceptions to this general rule. It is generally conceded that there
is no presumption in treason or murder' and probably in "other heinous
offenses", as well as in those crimes peculiarly likely to be engaged in by
women.' The problem that deserves consideration is: is there in crime,
however trivial or gross, committed by a married woman in her husband's presence, any longer a valid reason for a presumption of coercion?
The answer to this question is not difficult. It has been stated that
the rule is "an anomaly in our jurisprudence for which it is not easy to
offer a perfectly satisfactory explanation";' that: "The contention that
a wife has no more intelligence or responsibility than a child is now out
of date.

No one believes it",' and that "the presumption - - - having been

created solely by judicial decision should be set aside in the same mode,
since we have advanced from the barbarism upon which it was based."'

1. (1920) 220 S. W. 25.
2. (1910) 42 Mo. App. Rep. 417, 127
S. W. 406.
3. 1 Wharton Cr. Law, Secs. 96 &
97; 1 Bishop New Cr. Law Sec. 357
et seq.; State v. MaFoo (1892) 110 Mo.
1. c. 16, 19 S. W. 222; People v. Ryland
(1884) 97 N. Y. 126; State v. Williams
(1871) 65 N. C. 398.
4. 1 Bishop New Cr. Law, See. 361.
Mr. Bishop states that these crimes are
commonly excepted and more than mere
presence is required to raise the presumption. Mr. Wharton states as a matter of principle that if the presence of
the husband is a good defense at all it
is good in all classes of crimes. Apparently, he was referring to coercion, as

a defense and not to any presumption.
Mr. Bishop's analysis is more careful
and, carefully read, does not state that
coercion ceases to be a defense in cases

of murder, treason or robbery. Compare
Bibb' v. State (1892) 94 Ala. 31, 10 So.
506, 33 Am. St. Rep. 88, denying the
defense of coercion in murder.
5. 1 Wharton Cr. Law, Sec. 99; 1
Bishop's Cr. Law, Sec. 361; State v.
Keithley (1910) 142 Mo. App. 1. c. 421,
127 S. W. 406; People v. Wheeler (1905)
142 Mich. 212, 105 N. W. 607.
6. Note to Bibb v. State (1892) 33
Am. St. Rep. 89.
7. State v. Seahorn (1914) 166 N. C.
373, 81 S. E. 689.
8. See note 49 Am. Law Rev. 447.
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Also, in Kainsas,' the court in a forward looking decision, repudiating the
presumption, said: "But it cannot be right now under our present condition of society. And it is not the law. There was once a reason for
the presumption; but that reason has long ago ceased to exist in Kansas; and when the reason for the presumption has ceased to exist, the
presumption itself must also cease to exist."
Arkansas has perhaps abolished the presumption by statute" and in
referring to this ruling Gantt, P. J., in State v. MaFoo,' said: "The
statutory rule in Arkansas, supra, is more in accord with the spirit of
the age in which we live." These authorities might be multiplied," for
this rule although undoubtedly the law in a majority of jurisdictions in
this country, seems to be nowhere defended in reason, and is continually
criticised.
The reason for its continued existence may lie in the explanation
given by way of dictum by Beardsley, J., in Blakeslee v. Margaret Tyler,"
to-wit: "The presumption in many, if not in most cases, probably rested
upon a slender basis of fact, but generally prevailed, owing to the inherent difficulty of proving that it was not well founded."
When the reason for a rule fails the rule fails. Such has been the
boast of the common law judges. The chief virtue of the system lies in
its pliability and susceptibility to reason and change. There is none to
deny that this rule has in reason failed; yet many courts still follow it.
State v. Miller' shows to what extreme the rule has led us. The wife
there at the request of the husband, who was in jail, secured a revolver
and carried it to him. She was convicted on a statutory charge and upon
9. State v. Hendricks (1884) 32 Kan.
559, 4 Pac. 1050.
10. Frell v. State (1860) 21 Ark.
213.
11. (1892) 110 Mo. 1.c. 17, 19 S. W.
222.
12. 1 Wharton Cr. Law, Sec. 96:
"Ihe difficulty, however, is in finding,
in the present state of society, when the
husband is as likely to support the wife
if she is engaged in doing wrong, as the
wife is to support the husband, any
reason on which the presumption is to
rest."
See also Smith v. Myers (1898)
54 Neb. I. c. 6, 74 N. W. 277.
8. Har. Law Rev. 430: "This presumption of coercion in criminal cases
seems to have preserved a place in our
law long after all reason for it has passed
away."

13. (1887) 55 Conn. 1. c. 300, 11 Atl.
855.
14. (1901) 162 Mo. 253, 85 Am. St.
Rep. 498, 62 S. W. 692. See also 15
Har. Law Rev. 234 for a criticism of
this decision:
"So far from following
this tendency, the principal case seems
to be an unwarrantable extension of the
doctrine. The intention was formed, the
execution of the crime begun and all
but completed outside the jail, and the
fact that the defendant came into her
husband's actual presence simultaneously
with the completion of the crime can
hardly justify the presumption in question. - - - Even if coercion could be
presumed, slight circumstances will rebut it, and the jury should have been
allowed to decide whether the husband's
helpless situation was sufficient to do
so."
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appeal the court allowed the point that there was a presumption of coercion, and that there was not sufficient evidence to justify the jury in
finding that she was not coerced. If the test is alone coverture and
presence, the decision, it is submitted, is sound, but if the test is ability
to coerce, a likelihood that she was prevented from acting as a free agent
the decision is nearly, if not quite, absurd.
It is submitted that the rule is unsound, illogical and cumbersome to
justice. It should therefore be abolished. The statement of a North
Carolina 5 court seems a sufficient justification. "- - - - the presumption
- - - having been created solely by judicial decisions should be set aside
in the same mode". There is no need for legislative interference. What
society knows is absurd should not be a part of the law. It is to be
hoped that when the matter again comes before the Supreme Court of
Missouri the doctrine will be repudiated and coercion be required to be
proved as a matter of fact.
C. L. C.
PRACTICE-DIRECTION OF THE VERDICT FOR THE PARTY BEARING THE BURDEN OF PROOF. Quisenberry v. Stewart
et a/.' Ejectment. The land in dispute was for some years within the
fence boundaries of the land now owned by the defendant. The plaintiff put in evidence his paper title and then a survey, and this testimony
showed that the disputed strip was within the description called for by
the paper title. The defendant offered evidence that the fence was erected
on an agreed line. It was held that the credibility of the defendant's evidence was solely a question for the jury. It cannot be said that defendant's evidence was unequivocal and wholly uncontradicted and, so,
without question the actual decision of the court is sound. The case,
however, is of interest because of its approval of a statement in Hunter
v. Wethington :'a
"As this case will have to be retried, there is one other question to
be noted. Defendant contends that as two witnesses testified to the adverse possession in defendant for ten years, the trial court could not do
otherwise than to find for the defendant. This does not necessarily follow. The credibility of that testimony, although undisputed by direct
testimony, was for the trier of the facts."
1. (1920) 219 S. W. 625. See also
Printz v. Miller (1911) 233 Mo. 47, 135
S. W. 19, and Johnson v. Grayson (1910)
230 Mo. 380, 130 S. W. 673, holding a

But see the following cases:
action.
May v. Crawford (1899) 150 Mo. 504,
Crawford v. Stayton
51 S. W. 693;
131 Mo. App. 263, 110 S. W.
(1908)

verdict will nct be directed for plaintiff
in a law case where the allegations of
his petition are denied and he introduces
oral evidence to support his cause of

665.

la. (1907)
S. W. 543.

205

Mo.

1. c. 292,

103

NOTES ON RECENT MISSOURI CASES

This case is the last case in Missouri approving the doctrine that a
trial court may not direct a verdict in favor of the party bearing the burden of proof though he may have sustained the burden with uncontradicted testimony.
There are two theories on which the courts today direct verdicts.
First, the court may direct against the plaintiff only when there is no
evidence in his favor
Second, the court may direct against the plaintiff in case the jury as reasonable men could not possibly find for him,
or as a Massachusetts court' puts it, in case the jury found for the plaintiff, the court would be compelled to set the verdict aside any number
of times as being against the evidence.
Missouri, however, has adhered to a policy of great liberality in leaving questions of fact to the jury for final determination. And the rule
in Missouri today is that the evidence must be construed in its strictest
sense against the defendant, including all inferences that can be made
against him, allowing no inferences for the defendant to offset, and if
then there is evidence enough to support a verdict, the motion for a
directed verdict must be overruled.'
Having then in mind the two theories on which a court will direct
a verdict, the next question to arise is, should a court direct a verdict in
According to the principal
favor of one bearing the burden of proof?
case the court should not. The grounds on which this decision is upheld are (1). that it is the province of the jury to pass upon the evidence,'
and (2) that the jury should say whether they believe the witnesses.' It
is contended that to take from the jury this question is to deprive the
people of the right of trial by jury.' Is such a contention true?
No court will refuse to direct against the plaintiff, if he has not offered a scintilla of evidence,' yet many courts will not direct in his favor,
though he has made a strong case, and there is not a scintilla of evidence
against him.' Why? Does this seem to be a sound principle for the
speedy and economical administration of justice? Can we truthfully
say that a person is deprived of any of those rights assured by trial
by jury if he has a verdict directed against him under such circumstances?
He may ask for a new trial, or appeal the same as if the case had gone
2. Way, Administrator, etc., v. The
Illinois Central R. R. Co. (1872) 35
Ia. 585.
3. Denny v. Williams (1862) 5 Allen
1.
4. Maginnis v. Railroad (1916) 268
Mo. 1. c. 675, 187 S. W. 1165.

6. Bryan v. Wear & Hickman (1885)
4 Mo. 106.
7. Woodin v. Durfee (1881) 46 Mich.
424, 9 N. W. 457.
8. San Antonio Traction Co. v. Levyson (1908) 52 Tex. Civ. App. 122, 113
S. W. 569.

5. Lnhrs v. Brooklyn Heights R. Co.
(1896) 11 App. Div. 173, 42 N. Y. Supp.
606. See 10 Harvard Law Review 453.

9. Printz v. Miller (1911)
1. c. 49, 135 S. W. 19.

233 Mo.
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0
to the jury."
In a jurisdiction where the second theory prevails he has
lost nothing more than the possible chance of having the jury return a
verdict in his favor, which must immediately be set aside as against
the evidence.
But it is contended that this makes the court and not the jury decide on the truthfulness of the witnesses.'
In Pleasants v. Fant,2 Miller, J., says: "In the discharge of this
duty it is the province of the court, either before or after the verdict, to
decide whether the plaintiff has given evidence sufficient to support or
justify a verdict in his favor. Not whether on all of the evidence, the
preponderating evidence is in his favor, that is the business of the jury,
but conceding to all of the evidence offered, the greatest probative force
which to the law of evidence it is fairly entitled to, is it sufficient to justify the verdict? If it does not then it is the duty of the court after
verdict, to set it aside and grant a new trial. Must the court go through
the idle ceremony in such a case of submitting to the jury the testimony
on which plaintiff relies, when it is clear to the judicial mind that if
the jury should find a verdict in favor of the plaintiff, that verdict would
be set aside and a new trial granted."
If this reasoning be sound, and there are many cases1' in accord,
it must be conceded that the court can decide this point as well before
verdict as after, and the jury is deprived of none of its duties by the
court directing their verdict.
But it is sometimes contended that though a court may direct against
the plaintiff, it cannot direct for him, because there must be an agreement of facts before the court is entitled to pass on them."4 It is said
that in the case of directing against the plaintiff, the defendant, by asking
for the direction admits all of testimony of plaintiff as true and consents that the court may pass on it as a fact, but in case of the plaintiff
asking for verdict, he cannot admit his own testimony as facts and consent for the defendant, hence it must be for the jury and not for the
court to decide the question of fact.

It would seem that this objection may be overcome by applying a
rule used in pleading, namely, that an averment not denied is admitted.
If plaintiff offers an abundance of testimony, which the defendant neither
attempts to deny, nor impeach the witnesses by whom it is offered, then
may we not say that the defendant must admit the truth of plaintiff's
testimony?
10. Meyer v. Houck (1892) 85 Ia.
I. c. 327, 52 N. W. 235.
11. Gannon v. Laclede Gaslight Co.
(1898) 145 Mo. 502, 46 S. W. 968.
12. (1874) 22 Wall. 116.

13. Sprague v. Androscoggin County
(1908) 104 Me. I. c. 354, 71 Atlantic
889. .
14. 12 Harvard Law Review 433.

NOTES ON RECENT MISSOURI CASES

In Gannon v. The Laclede Light Company" this point arose, and
though the case was decided according to the rule announced in the case
under review, there is a strong dissenting opinion by Marshall, J., in
which Sherwood and Brace, JJ., concurred. He states that if there
is no controversy over the facts, there is no question for the jury, and
says: "If the facts are shown by competent evidence on one side, and
the evidence is not contradicted on the other, and there is no attempt to
impeach the witnesses, there is no question of fact involved in the case,
but a simple question of law presented. To permit a jury to say* that
it will not believe competent uncontradicted and unimpeached testimony
and to return a verdict in the teeth of such evidence, is to give the jury
plenary power to take a man's life or property as caprice or willfulness
may dictate."
There are many earlier decisions in the state which hold that a trial
court may direct a verdict in favor of either party as pointed out in this
dissenting opinion.
In Morgan v. Durfee5 Sherwood, C. J., observed that it was not
usurping the power of the jury for the court to direct in favor of either
party, but rather that it was a duty which it should exercise, and which
is often shirked. He speaks of it as a power of a trial court, seldom used,
"owing to a pitiful and painful weakness in the dorsal region". A later
review of this decision, in the Central Law Journal," goes even further in
commenting upon trial courts for refusing to direct a verdict in favor
of either party.
There are quite a few decisions 8 holding that a trial court may
direct a verdict for either party including the party having the burden.
The question after all is said is simply this: there are cases where
it is evident to the judicial mind that there is such uncontradicted testimony that if the jury brought in a verdict in the face of such testimony,
it would be the plain duty of the court to set aside the verdict as against
the evidence. We submit that in such cases it would be a better and
more practical rule for the court to direct a verdict. We further submit
that it works no hardship nor does it deny any rights guaranteed by a trial
by jury. The following reasoning by a well known author correctly
states the matter thus :"
15. (1898) 145 Mo. 502, 46 S. W.
968, 47 S. W. I. c. 916.
16. (1879) 69 Mo. 469.
17. 9 Central Law Journal 102.
18.

Woodstock v.

Canton (1897)

91

Me. 62, 39 At. 281; Chanute v. Higgins (1902) 65 Kan. 680, 70 Pac. 638;
Meyer v. Houck (1892) 85 Ia. 319, 52
N. W. 235; Webber v. Axtell (1910)

110 Minn. 52, 124 N. W. 453; Marshall v. Grosse Clothing Co. (1900) 184
Il1. 421, 56 N. E. 807; Donnan v. Donman (1912) 256 Ill. 244, 99 N. E. 931;
McArthur Co. v. National Bank (1889)
122 Mich. 223, 81 N. W. 92.

19. See 11 Mich. Law Review 198
for discussion of this subject by Profes.
sor Sunderland, a recognized authority
on pleading and practice questions.
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"The ba3ic principle underlying the cases which deny the court the
right to instruct the jury in favor of the party having the burden of
proof, is, as already indicated, that the jury has the right to disbelieve all
the witnesses even though the facts to which they testify are uncontroverted and inherently credible, and the witnesses unimpeached. Why the
jury should be given any such license it is hard to understand. Juries
cannot be permitted to exercise blind and unreasoning power to oppress
litigants. They must conduct themselves as sensible and reasonable
men. 'They cannot be suffered to base verdicts on caprice, conjecture,
passion or prejudice."
P. M. P.

CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW-CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE-INDICTMENT AND INFORMATION. State v. Adkins1 . Accused was
charged by information with murder in the first degree. He was convicted of murder in the second degree and appealed to the Supreme Court
of Missouri. There the judgment was reversed and the cause remanded
on account of an erroneous instruction. The fact that the word "the"
before the word "state" was omitted from the conclusion of the indictment was held not to be reversible error even though the Constitution of Missouri provides " . . . and all indictments shall conclude,
'against the peace and dignity of the State'."2
Under early common law, indictments were framed according to fixed
forms, established by statute or by custom and practice. Such resulted
in part from the creation of many new offenses; in part from the development of the art of special pleading; and especially from the severity
of the criminal law of the period. As a natural result there was an
effort to pick flaws in the indictments. This resulted in the framing of
complicated and formal indictments. The least departure from fixed
forms would have been fatal.'
The conclusion of the indictment charging a common law offense
was in a specifically required form for an additional reason. This part
was to show to whom the forfeiture would accrue and was in these
words: "against the peace of our lord the king (our lady the queen)
his (her) crown and dignity". In view, then, of the requirement of
formal indictments, even an immaterial departure from this phrased conclusion would have been error.
During the early part of the nineteeth century there was great improvement in England.
Statutes were passed removing most of the

1.
2.

(1920) 225 S. W. 981.
Article VI, Sec. 38.

3. "The Indictments Act", Jour. Com.
Leg. (1916) Vol. 16 N. S. p. 238.
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technical requirements.' And although some statutory requirements remained, the courts became less strict and literal compliance with the
statutes was rarely required. This reaction came with the decrease in
the number of offenses and the lessening of the severity of punishment.
Substantial compliance with the statutes became sufficient.'
Most of the states in this country have by constitution or statute
required some fixed form for indictments, especially of conclusions of
indictments. Nevertheless, it has been generally held that only substantial compliance with the required form is necessary.'
The Missouri courts have declared that substantial compliance with
the formal requisities in indictments, as provided by the constitution or
statutes, is sufficient. The difficulty has been to determine what is substantial compliance. In State v. Lopez' an indictment concluding "against
the peace of the statute and of the statute in such cases made and provided" did not meet the constitutional requirement for a conclusion
"against the peace and dignity of the State". In State v. Mitchell8 the
indictment was quashed for using the words ". . did . . . disturb a conThe court there said the word
gration", instead of "congregation".
"congration" was not an English word. However they seemed to base
their decision on their belief that such relaxation would tend to establish
a precedent for disregarding required forms. In State v. Waters' the indictment concluded: "Against the peace and dignity of the State, and
contrary to the form of the statutes in such cases made and provided
by the State", instead of merely "against the peace and dignity of the
State", as provided by the constitution. The court held that, as the
words required were present, the remainder was surplusage. It was
stated by Lewis, J.,: "The general doctrine is that, if the intent of the
Constitution be substantially responded to in this part of the indictment,
a literal transcript of the formula is not necessary". This principle was
0
followed in State v. Hays," were the words "of Missouri", following the
word "State", were held not to vary, enlarge, or change the phrase or
the sense. State v. Schloss" also held that words added to the required
phrase were surplusage and that the required words being present, there
was substantial compliance with the constitution. The court distinguished
the case from State V. Lopez, supra, and State v. Pemberton," in which
4. jour. Corn. Leg. Vol. 16 N. S.
p. 239-247.
5. See State v. Hornsby (1884) 8
Rob. (La.) 554.
6. For a review of the American
cases, see 22 Cyc., p. 244, note 93.
7. (1853) 19 Mo. 255.
Compare
8. (1857)
25 Mo. 420.

State v. Duvenick (1911) 237 Mo. 185,
140 S. W. 897, holding "agains the peace
and dignity of the state" is sufficient.
9. (1876) 1 Mo. App. 7.
10. (1883) 78 Mo. 600.
11. (1887) 93 Mo. 361.
12 (1860) 30 Mo. 376. Indictment in
two counts. First count omitted the en-
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cases "neither the constitutional words, nor words of like import, were
used".
In State v. Campbell," the conclusion of the indictment omitted the
word "the" before "State". The court adopted the principle laid down
in State v. Waters, supra, that matters of substance and not of form
would be required. Nevertheless, the court held that the omission of the
word "the" was reversible error because the definite article "the" was
necessary "in order to designate the particular state against which the
offense is charged to have been committed". It is possible to argue that
the court was of the opinion, also, that every constitutional requirement
is a matter of substance and that any alteration of the form specified
would be fatal. This seems not to be the generally accepted law."4 State
v. Skillman"' was decided at the same term and follows State v. Campbell. State v. Warner" likewise follows and relies upon State v. Campbell.
The formal conclusion in an indictment does not serve the purpose
that it did at common law. It is at most a debatable question if there
is any purpcse served by the conclusion of the indictment specified in the
constitution of this state." It is hardly probable that the accused does
not know that he is accused of violating the laws of the State of Missouri since the indictment, commences "State of Missouri", etc.
The purposes of an indictment are: first, to enable the accused to prepare his defense; second, to enable him to plead as a defense, his former
conviction or acquittal, in case he is again prosecuted for the same offense; and third, to give the court opportunity to decide the case on the
indictment without hearing the evidence." It is clear that the omission
of the word "the" in this instance will deny none of these rights. If,
then, this omission deprives the accused of no information to which he
is entitled, and if the word cannot be said to be a matter of substance,
it remains that its presence serves at most to complete a mere rhetorical
flourish, and its omission should not be reversible error."
The decision under review marks a definite step in advance. The
tire phrase "against the peace and dignity of the State".
See discussion in
State v. Stacy (1890) 103 Mo. 11, 15
S. W. 147;
State v. Ulrich (1902) 96
Mo. App. 689,
70 S. W. 933.
13.
(1907) 210 Mo. 202, 109 S. W.
706, 14 Ann. Cas. 403.
14. Pacific Railroad v. The Governor

198 S. W. 830.
Compare State ex
v. Hitchcock (1911)
241 Mo. 1. c,
146 S. W. 40.
15. (1907) 209 Mo. 408, 107 S.
1071.
16. (1909) 220 Mo. 23, 119 S.
399.
17.
See 50 Am. Law Rev. pp.

(1856) 23 Mo. 353, 66 Am. Dec. 673;
State v. Foster (1876)
61 Mo. 549;
Riesterer v. Land & Lumber Co.

310.
18. See 24 Har. Law Rev. 290, "The
Seventeenth Century Indictment in the

(1900)
160 Mo. 141, 61 S. W. 238;
Creason v. Yardley (1917) 272 Mo. 279,

Light
19.

of Modern Conditions".
See 68 Central Law Journal,

rel.
464,
W.
W.
305-

p.
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gratitude of the bar is due to Williamson, J., whose progressive mind
sought for an opportunity to correct a point of view that has caused
no inconsiderable lack of respect for law and legal institutions. The
commendable opinion re-vitalizes the law of criminal procedure in Missouri.
Virgil Rathbun' °

PLEADING-FALSE IMPRISONMENT-SURPLUSAGE.
Hill
v. S. S. Kresge Co. et al.'The court in the above case-an action for
false imprisonment-made the following statement:
"If plaintiff unnecessarily pleaded malice in his petition in connection with his request
for actual damages, there is no question but that it would be necessary
for him to prove and submit malice in his instructions covering such
damages."
It is a general rule that anything in a petition that is unnecessary to
the cause of action may. be regarded as surplusage, and proof thereof
is not necessary to sustain the cause of action.' It is an undenied rule
that malice and want of probable cause are not necessary elements of false
imprisonment.' It would seem then, by all the rules of pleading, that allegations of malice and want of probable cause in a petition for false
imprisonment are surplusage and might be disregarded.
The statement quoted is, therefore, apparently fallacious and unsound in principle. It is interesting to trace back and see how the doctrine started and how such a statement has crept into Missouri law.
In the principal case the rule is merely laid down by the court and
no reason or justification is given. We must then look to the citations
given by the court to find the reasons for the rule.
There are two citations given and turning to the first, Billingsley v.
Kline Cloak Co.,4 we find that the rule there stated was not exactly as
stated in the case under review but as follows: "We have already called
attention to the fact that plaintiff -alleged the arrest and imprisonment
were without probable cause, and that she tried her case on that theory
and she concedes that she must abide by that theory in this court."
Perhaps this conclusion is sound as the plaintiff had not merely alleged unnecessary facts in a petition but had adopted a theory throughout a trial that he later attempted to repudiate. The court in the case
421, for review and criticism of State
v. Campbell (1907) 210 Mo.
S. W. 706, 14 Ann. Cas. 403

202,

109

20. Student, School of Law, University of Missouri.
1.
(1919) 217 S. W. 997.
2. Pattison Missouri Code Pleading,

2nd Ed. Sec. 103. 24 Standard Encyclopedia of Procedure 580. Hudson v. The
Wabash Ry. Co. (1890)

101 Mo. 13, 14

S. W. 15.
3. 12 Ann. Cas. 35.
4.

(1917)

196 S. W. 415.
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just quoted from cities five cases' and from -Cyc' to support the rule.
One of the cases cited is Murphy v. McAdory, the second citation given
in the principal case.
Taking up the Cyc reference, we find a statement that it is sufficient
to allege that the imprisonment was "against his will and illegally", but
at the end of the paragraph, there is this sentence, "It has been held that
if plaintiff alleges malice and want of probable cause, although unnecessary, he must prove those elements." It would seem that the court took
this statement of the Cyc author, Judge E. A. Jaggard, formerly of the
Minnesota Supreme Court, to be the law without considering the reasonableness or basis therefor; for looking at the Cyc footnote, we find but
one citation, Fuqua v. Gambill, one of the five cases mentioned above.
We must then turn to the cases mentioned for the basis of the rule.
Russell v. Chester and Pritehett v. Sullivan are the only cases cited
that are nol. Alabama cases. The latter is a Federal case and cites the
former as the sole authority for the point decided. The point decided in
these cases, however, is not the point for which they are cited by the
Missouri court. The cases hold that want of probable cause having
been pleaded by plaintiff the defendant, an officer who arrested without a
warrant, may, under the general denial, show probable cause on his part
for believing a felony had been committed. That an officer may arrest
without a warrant upon reasonable suspicion that a felony has been committed is pointed out in these cases. These cases are not in point and
may be disregarded. This leaves three Alabama cases to support the
rule. Two of them refer directly to the third, Rich v. Mclnerny. This
case, then, would seem to have been the basis for the announced rule,
and to it we must turn for the reasons supporting the rule.
From the opinion of Head, J., we find that in 1849 in Ragsdale v.
Bowles,' an action for malicious prosecution, the averments of the complaint were, "that the defendant falsely, maliciously and without probable cause," etc., did certain things. The declaration was demurred to
on the ground that it did not sufficiently aver the termination of the
prosecution. The court held the count bad for malicious prosecution,
but a sustainable count for false imprisonment. The court's conclusion
evidently being that the words, "falsely, maliciously and without probable cause", were sufficient to show that the imprisonment was unlawful.
It is clear that the court did not intend to say that these elements were
essential to the action. Shortly after this case was decided, the Ala5. Russell v. Shuster (1844) 8 Watts
& S. (Pa.) 308; Fuqua v. Gambill (1903)
140 Ala. 464, 37 Southern 235; Rich v.
Mclnerny (1893) 103 Ala. 345, 15 Southern 663; Pritchett V. Sullivan (1910) 182

Fed. 480, 104 C. C. A. 624; Murphy v.
McAdory (1913) 183 Ala. 209, 62 Southern 706.
6. 19 Cyc (339) 359.
7. (1849) 16 Ala. 62.
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bama Code of 1852 was adopted. In it was contained a schedule of
forms for various actions, and for the form for false imprisonment substantially codified the declaration of the Ragsdale case. The same
form, save for the correction of a minor error, has been carried into the
code of 1907.8 But the code itself thus defines false imprisonment:
"False imprisonment consists of the unlawful detention of the person
of another, for any length of time, whereby he is deprived of his personal
liberty."'
It appears that an essential difference exists between the elements
of false imprisonment, as laid down by the code and the pleading form
given in the code. Head, J.,9a in explaining says: "We are of opinion
that it was not the intention of the legislature to make this form exclusive. We cannot suppose it was designed to abolish the probably graver
offenses of false imprisonment, civilly actionable, which are not characterized by the elements the form makes essential. This question, however, is not now before us, since the present complaint pursues the form
prescribed. - - - - Being alleged, these elements must be shown to have

existed, to justify a recovery by the plaintiff."
The Alabama court did not attempt to lay down a general rule that
malice and want of probable cause, if pleaded, must be proved. The
court only held that where one pleads under an erroneous form placed
in the Alabama Code, then he must abide thereby and prove his complaint though it does contain elements which would not otherwise be
essential to his cause of action. This decision may be sound because of
the peculiar situation that arises under the Alabama code. As a general
proposition of law, it is submitted that it is not sound and that such
a decision anywhere other than under the Alabama code is erroneous.
Standard Encyclopedia of Procedure'" states the rule in almost the
same words as Cyc but adds:

"The better holding would seem to be

to regard them merely as surplusage which need not be proved, or as
inserted to enhance the damages." After citing all of the cases in accord it is noted that they are all controlled by the Alabama code.
In Annotated Cases ' we find the proposition stated and five Alabama cases cited in support. The annotator then states that the view
treating it as surplusage is probably the better rule and in support of it
1
cites a California case 2, three Illinois cases" and a New York case. "
8. Section 5382, Form 19,
Alabama 1907, Vol. II-Civil.

Code of

9. Section 4238, Code of Alabama,
1907-Vol. II, Civil.
9a. Rich v. McInerny (1893) 103 Ala.
345, 1. c. 354, 15 So. 663.
10. 8 Standard Encyclopdeia of Pro-

cedure 965.

11.

12 Ann. Cas. (. c.) 36.

12. Nerves v. Costa (1907) 5. Cal.
App. 111, 89 Pac. 860.
13. Enright v. Gibson (1906) 219 II.
550, 76 N. E. 689; Hight v. Naylor
(1899) 86 Ill. App. 508; Johnson v.
Kettler (1876) 84 I11.315. There Schol-

field, J., said:

"The objection that the
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5
Ruling Case Law mentions the holding and cites Rich v. Mclnerny,
accord,
and
a Minnesota'" case, contra.
supra, in
From the above review it is found that of the five states in which
this point has come up, Missouri is the only one to follow the Alabama
case. The court in the principal case evidently accepted the first Missouri decision without question, but it is submitted that the statement
is unsound in principle and is not supported by authority.
P. M. P.

declaration charges that the imprisonment was 'without any reasonable or
probable cause whatever,' and that the
court refused to instruct the jury that
it was necessary to make proof of this,
would be well taken were the action in
case for improperly putting in motion
regular process of the court; but the action is for trespass for imprisoning, etc.,
without legal process, and the gist is the
unlawful, direct force, and the words,

probable
'without
any
reasonable
or
The citation of
cause,' were surplusage.
authorities can not be necessary on a distinction so well established as this is in
the elementary works."
(1869)
3
14. Ackroyd v. Ackroyd
Daly (N. Y.) 38.
15. 11 R. C. L. Art 33, page 819.
16. Nixon v. Reeves (1896) 65 Minn.
159, 67 N. W. 989, 33 L. R. A. 506,
perhaps not in

point.

